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What Do We Mean by Law and
Social Transformation?*
Judy Fudge
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University

Abstract - In Canada the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms generateda good deal of debate about the possibility of using
law in the struggle for social transformation. Although couched in
general terms, the current debate is ultimately about the possibility of
assertingliberal democratic legal rights in courts in order to transform
existing relations of subordination and domination. Somewhat
remarkably, the positive claim that litigating entrenched legal rights
encouragessocial transformationtends to be made almost exclusively at
the theoretical level. Theoretical possibilities, rather than concrete
victories,are invoked to support the claim for the transformativecapacity
of liberal legal rights. Instead of approachingthe question of litigating
social change from an exclusively theoretical perspective, this paper
examines contemporary examples in order to illustrate some of the
possibilities of and limits to this strategy. Specifically, the paper
examines how both the labour and women's movements have used the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedomsto further their social,political
and economic goals.Not only did these two groups adopt widely different
strategies during the entrenchment process, what is entailed by the
assertion of bourgeois legal rights has a different meaning for each.
Thus, by contrasting the experience of the labour and women's
movements in invoking the Charter it is possible to begin to suggest the
limits of liberal rights in the strugglefor social transformation.
Risum - Au Canada,la difense de la Charte des droits et des fibert~s a
donni lieu d une quantitide ddbats sur l'utilisationpossible de la Loi pour
obtenir des changements sociaux. Prisentid'unefagon trds genfrale, le
ddbat actuel propose enfait la possibilitf de revendiquerdes droits ldgaux,
liboraux et dimocratiques devant les tribunaux pour transformer les
situationsde domination et de subordinationqui existent maintenant. II
semblerait que, d'un point de vue thgorique, la lutte pour la d.fense des
droits d la justice encourage le changement social. Des possibilit's
thLdoriques, plut~t que des victoires concretes, sont invoqudes pour

CJLSIRCDS Vol. 5 (1990)
supporter la these de la capacitd transformative des droits ligaux et
libiraux. Au lieu d'une approche th46orique au sujet du litige pour obtenir
des changements sociaux, cette stude examine plut6t des exemples
contemporains pour illustrer les possibilitis et les limites de cette
mithode. Plus particuligrement, cette 4tude analyse comment le
mouvement ouvrier et le mouvementfiministe se sont servis de la Charte
Canadienne des droits et des libertts pour atteindre leurs objectifs sociaux,
politiques et 6conomiques. Non seulement ces deux groupes ont-ils
adoptds des stratigiesdiffirentespendant le procddd de retranchement,mais
ce qui est requis pour la revendicationde droits ldgaux bourgeoisa une
signification diffrrente pour chacun d'eux. Donc, en itablissant le
contrasteentre l'expdrience du mouvement ouvrier et celle du mouvement
fiministe vis-d-vis de la Charte, on peut 4baucher les limites des droits
sociaux dans la lutte pour la transformationsociale.

Historical consciousness ought to assist one to understand the possibilities of
transformation and the possibilities within people. E.P. Thompson
What are the limits to and the possibilities of using law in the struggle for social transformation? This question has triggered a lively debate. In Canada it
was sparked by the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedomsl and in
Britain by the authoritarian populism of Thatcher's conservative government and
her attack on traditional civil liberties. Governments in Western Europe and
North America have, to varying degrees, responded to the series of shocks to the
Keynesian economic and social compromise which occurred during the 1970s by
realigning the institutional balance further in favour of capital. Wage controls
were implemented, deregulation and privatization characterized economic policy,
and inflation and deficit reduction triumphed over unemployment and social welfare on the political agenda. Social democractic and other labour-aligned political
parties seem either incapable of or unconcerned with stopping the spread of the
new conservative economic and political wisdom. Consequently, since the beginning of the 1980s the (broadly-defined) left increasingly has come to doubt
that legislative politics will lead to social transformation. Moreover, the fact
that authoritarian populist governments have started to erode what had previously
seemed secure civil liberties, reinforces the left's disillusionment with electoral
politics and nourishes the search for an alternative arena of struggle. 2 It is in
this context which we must place the call for the defence and expansion of liberal
3
legal rights.
Two articles recently published in Canada come down on the affirmative side
of the debate on the transformative capacity of law-according to Brickey and
Comack, and Bartholemew and Boyd, law can be used in the struggle for progressive social transformation. 4 Both pieces offer impressive syntheses of a growing
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literature which attempts to locate law in the wider social relations of domination and subordination. Moreover, each rejects a dichotomized approach to theory and a unidimensional conception of law. According to Brickey and Comack
"law offers an important (although by no means the sole) source for realizing
substantive social change." 5 Drawing upon their survey of the Canadian political economy approach to law, Bartholemew and Boyd conclude that "[law, legal
institutions, and rights represent both spaces and tensions, contradictions and
possibilities, limitations and potential." 6 And both sets of authors assert that
the way forward is to develop a theory of law which incorporates and recognizes
7
law's transformative potential.
Although it is couched in general terms, the current debate is ultimately about
the limitations and possibilities of liberal democratic legal rights for transforming existing social relations of domination and subordination. The struggles
for liberal legal rights by the women's and civil rights movements have been cited as evidence for the conclusion that the struggle for liberal legal democratic
8
rights is an important part of the overall struggle for social transformation.
Sumner makes the strong claim that a socialist transformation requires the extension of liberal legal (or civil) rights to all members of the working class:
the formation of the class-for-itself has necessary legal conditions (de jure and de
facto), e.g., legal personality for all (i.e., including prisoners, bastards, lunatics,
women, immigrants-all at one time or one place effectively split off from the
rest of the class by legal procedures and institutions, universal sufferage, the right
to free association), the right to own property, the right of disposal of one's own
body, etc. I would suggest that some substantial experience of winning and enjoying these freedoms is a necessary precondition of the formation of a class cul9
ture with a full sense of socialist democracy.
Sumner's claim is significant because he is arguing that the expansion of bourgeois legal rights is a necessary condition for social transformation. The legislative arena has always been viewed as an important, although insufficient, arena
of engagement precisely because it is clearly identified as part of the political arena. The pre-eminent juridical forms and institutions-bourgeois legal rights and
the common law courts-are now conceived of as important elements of the
struggle for transformation. This is what is new about Brickey and Comack's
and Bartholemew and Boyd's analyses-they are urging us to take the extension
of liberal democratic legal rights in the judicial forum seriously. Sumner, however, acknowledges that the realization of civil liberties and a rule of law which
protects people from the coercive aspects of both public and private authority depends on the overthrow of capitalist economic relations and the establishment of
socialism, since "[c]apitalism must always betray its legal promises."10 Thus,
the question ultimately is whether the assertion of bourgeois rights in the courts
allows us to challenge, or whether it merely reinforces, capitalist social relations. In contrast to Sumner, neither Bartholemew and Boyd, nor Comack and
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Brickey specify what they mean when they claim that law is essential for social
transformation. For them it is sufficient that subordinate groups have sought recourse to the judicial forum to articulate their demands in the form of the extension of liberal democratic rights.II But, as Ellen Wood has noted,
it is precisely the recourse that subordinate groups have had to judicial and political institutions in their relations with the dominant classes, together with restrictions on the 'freedom! of the state itself, that have created a faith-though hardly
unlimited-in the efficacy of legal and political forms. 12
Faith alone is not enough to support a strategy. Rather, we need to examine
concrete examples in order to discover what limits are imposed upon, and what
possibilities are created by, the capitalist regime, its material order and its configuration of social power upon the transformative capacities of liberal legal
rights.
In what follows I shall examine two examples involving attempts by differently situated groups, the labour movement and the women's movement, to invoke
the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedomsto extend bourgeois legal rights to
their benefit. It is interesting to note the different positions of the two groups.
They adopted widely different strategies during the entrenchment process; the labour movement abstained from participating whereas the women's movement
used that process as an occasion for mobilizing. Moreover, what is entailed by
the extension of bourgeois legal rights has a different meaning for each group.
Trade unions have sought to expand their freedom to strike and to picket to influence industrial disputes in the face of legislative and judicial limitation by invoking the Charter'sprotection of the right to free expression and the right to associate. Essentially, trade unions have attempted to extend the traditional
bourgeois rights to collective entities for the purpose of economic action. The
women's movement, on the other hand, has sought to extend bourgeois legal
rights such as equality and natural justice to include a substantive, and not merely formal, component. By contrasting the experience of these two groups it may
be possible to begin to suggest the limits of liberal rights in the struggle for social transformation.
Trade Unions and Liberal Rights
Since the 1980s both provincial and federal governments in Canada have, to various degrees, undermined the post-war legislative framework regulating labour relations. The imposition of wage and price controls, ad hoc back to work legislation, the revocation of thousands of workers' right to engage in lawful strikes,
and provincial legislation rolling back hard won collective bargaining entitlements have led Panitch and Swartz to claim that the 1980s ushered in a change
13
in the labour relations paradigm from consent to coercion.
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In the face of these assaults unions have come to regard the avowed legislative
commitment to "free" collective bargaining with skepticism. Thus, some unions have sought to invoke the Charterof Rights and Freedoms to defend their
traditional collective bargaining entitlements from legislative incursions which
seek to limit workers' freedom to strike. Other trade unions have tried to extend
their collective power by using the Charterpositively. They have challenged the
legal rules limiting the scope of lawful picketing on the basis that such limitations constitute an infringment of their freedom of expression. To date the Supreme Court of Canada has issued six Charterdecisions ruling upon trade union
challenges to restrictions on the use of their collective power. 14 Despite carefully crafted legal arguments and sporadic academic protest, organized labour has
lost each time it has appeared before the Supreme Court to invoke the Charter in
order either to extend or protect its collective power.
Panitch and Swartz attribute labour's lack of success under the Charterto its
failure to participate in the constitutional debate which took place in the early
1980s. They charge that organized labour failed to present any challenge to the
liberal individualist philosophy that the Charterespouses. 1 5 However, the important question is not whether organized labour was at fault for failing to enter
into the constitutional debate, but whether labour's intervention would have
made a significant difference to the philosophy embedded in the Charter. Even
Panitch and Swartz acknowledge that this is unlikely. Recent work placing the
Charterin its political context suggests that it was designed to provide a mechanism to co-opt Quebec's struggles around language and independence, rather than
to provide greater freedom for the majority of Canadians. 16
If one turns to the cases decided by the Supreme Court which deal with labour's collective rights under the Charter,it is clear that they reinforce and extol
legal relations, principles and categories essential to capitalist production relations. In the trilogy of right to strike cases, a plurality of the Supreme Court issued a one-page decision which held that the "the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association found in s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms does not include, in the case of a trade union, a guarantee of the right
to bargain collectively and the right to strike .... "17 Starting from the premise
that freedom of association only includes those objects of association in which
other fundamental rights are implicated, Le Dain proceeded to characterize the
"modem" rights to bargain collectively and to strike as "the creation of legislation," rather than fundamental rights. Hence, he held that the rights to bargain
collectively and to strike are not protected by the Charter. And in his concurring
judgement, Maclntyre interpreted "freedom of association to mean that every individual is free to do with others that which he is lawfully entitled to do
alone."18 Striking, according to Maclntyre, is a collective right and, thus, is
qualitatively different from an individual right. Consequently, he decided that the
right to strike is not protected by the freedom to associate.
The right to strike trilogy provides a strong signal to governments across
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Canada that they are free to roll back workers' traditional legislative freedoms to
bargain collectively and to strike. Individual rights as opposed to collective
rights are to be protected. Fundamental rights and freedoms inhere in the common law, and not modem legislative enactments. This bodes ill for labour,
since workers have often exercised their democratic rights to obtain legislation
which modifies the worst aspects of the common law regime.
But of even greater significance than the trilogy of strike cases for demonstrating the limits of Charter litigation to further workers' struggles is the Supreme
Court's decision in R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery.19 Although the case

raised the issue of whether or not an injunction founded on the basis of the common law torts and issued to prevent peaceful secondary picketing constituted a
violation of the union's freedom of expression, it was decided on the basis of the
scope of the Charter'sapplication. According to Maclntyre, writing on behalf of
a unanimous court, the issue was whether the Charter applies to private litigation which was enforced via a court-issued injunction. While admitting that
from a political science standpoint the courts are unquestionably one of the three
fundamental branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial), he concluded that to "regard a court order as an element of governmental intervention
necessary to invoke the Charterwould, it seems to me, widen the scope of Charter's application to virtually all private litigation." 20 Thus, the union's Charter
argument failed, as the Court held that the Charterdoes not apply to an injunction granted by a trial judge applying the common law tort doctrine of inducement of breach of contract.
In DolphinDelivery, the Supreme Court demonstrated that it is not prepared to
interpret the Charter so as to authorize judicial intervention into the private
sphere, even though the allocation of private rights is underwritten by state power. Evidently, the Court's fear is that, if the Charter applies to a court order,
such as an injunction, an entire range of "private" dealings based on legal relations such as contract and property, would be subject to review on the basis of
an alleged infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms. According to the
Supreme Court, the constitutionally entrenched rights guaranteed by the Charter
protect the individual from the state, rather than protecting a weaker individual
from a more powerful one, even if the second individual's power is dependent
upon court enforcement of a web of legal relations.
The final two cases handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with
the issue of whether the Charter protects peaceful picketing by public sector
workers in front of provincial courts during lawful strikes. 2 1 During the course
of a lawful strike, the British Columbia Government Employees Union (the Union) posted pickets at the entrance to the courts of the province. The Union issued passes to authorize people, including officers of the court, to pass through
the picket lines. When he arrived at the courthouse that morning, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia (McEachem) issued, on his
own motion and ex parte, an injunction prohibiting the picketing of any courts
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in the province. McEachem later dismissed the Union's application to have the
injunction set aside, and his decision was upheld by a unanimous Court of Appeal.
At the Supreme Court Dickson characterized the case as involving "the fundamental right of every Canadian citizen to have unimpeded access to courts and
the authority of the courts to protect and defend that constitutional right."22 The
Union argued that the injunction violated, among other things, its right to engage in peaceful picketing which was guaranteed under the Charter'sprotection of
the freedom of expression. Invoking the rule of law, which he regarded as fundamental to the Charter,Dickson posed the following rhetorical question:
How can the courts independently maintain the rule of law and effectively dis-

charge the duties imposed by the Charter if court access is hindered, impeded or denied? The Charter protections would become merely illusory, the entire Charter
23
undermined.
After finding both that the Charter applied to the injunction and that peaceful
picketing during a lawful strike was prima facie protected activity under the
Charter'sguarantee of freedom of expression, the Court went on to hold that
McEachem's injunction was a justifiable limitation. According to Dickson:
A balance must be sought to be attained between the individual values and the
public or societal values. In the instant case, the task of striking a balance is not
difficult because without the public right to have absolute, free and unrestricted access to the courts the individual and private right to the freedom of expression
would be lost. The greaterpublic interest must be considered when determining
the degreeofprotection to be accordedto individual interests.24

The importance of this decision lies in its invocation of a purely formal and
eviscerated juridical conception of the rule of law as the foundation for the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms contained in the Charter,its characterization of
picketing as an individual right in contrast to the public right of formal access to
justice, and the total absence of any acknowledgement of the history of the
courts' use of equitable remedies such as injunctions to maintain the subordination of workers. Moreover, despite the fact that in a very similar situation in
Newfoundland where picketing had gone on for several days without causing any
"massive disruption" to the administration of justice, the Supreme Court took
judicial notice of the havoc court house picketing would wreak upon the rights
of Canadians.
In each of these cases the Supreme Court has decided not to use the Charterto
defend workers' "right" to strike or extend their freedom to picket. This suggests
that Charter litigation will prove to be a particularily unfavourable arena in
which to engage with the law for the purposes of transforming unequal power relations between workers and employers which are upheld and partially constituted
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by the common law. Not only are there structural and institutional limitations
to the types of decisions that the courts can make on a systematic basis, the nature of abstract rights and freedoms makes the Chartera tool of the powerful, as
well as the powerless. In fact, institutional limitations which undermine real access to justice (the availability of legal resources), the socialization of the judiciary, the form of legal argumentation, as well as the structural constraints imposed by essential legal relations, distinctions and principles, render the courts
perhaps the least suitable of the existing legal fora for engaging in struggles for
social transformation. 25 Other legal institutions may prove to be more permeable to transformative arguments. To date it has been through struggles in the
workplace, on the streets and in the legislative arena, whatever the latter's failings, that workers have obtained some relief from exploitive employment relations-as the examples of the factory acts, 26 workers compensation acts 27 and
collective bargaining legislation 2 8 attest. Moreover, workers have made these
gains despite the initial willingness of the courts to strike them down. 29 And it
is precisely these gains that the Charterrenders subject to legal challenge. 30
Feminist

Struggles

Simply because the labour movement has been unable to extend bourgeois legal
rights does not necessarily mean that other groups, in particular the women's
movement, cannot use these rights to transform aspects of social relations which
oppress women. It is possible that the labour movement's aspirations are peculiarily incompatible with the extension of bourgeois rights. Collective rights
addressed to economic inequality would challenge legal relations which are essential to capitalism. But not all forms of oppression are, however, so closely tied
to class relations. Women's sexual and economic subordination to men, although linked with, is not directly reducible to, class relations. 3 1 Consequently,
it is possible that the extension of legal rights may help to transform women's
sexual and economic subordination to men.
There are two aspects to this claim. The first is that the demand for formal legal equality itself may be an important progressive demand for feminists. According to Eisenstein:
[a]ll feminisms contain aspects of liberal feminism at their core-the demand for
equality, freedom of individual choice, and the recognition of woman as an autonomous being. However feminism chooses to define these particular demands these
32
are its starting points.
The second aspect of the claim for the progressive role of bourgeois legal rights
is that the assertion of constitutional and other general legal rights is an
extremely important and positive political act for feminist organizations.
Bourgeois legal rights are conceived of as important catalysts around which to
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mobilize political action. While these two claims are interconnected, I will deal
with each separately in order to illustrate what I think are the limits to a strategy
which involves the judicial expansion of bourgeois legal rights as part of the
struggle for social transformation.
Nowhere has the argument for the significance of legal rights and formal equality as the first step in the feminist struggle for substantive equality been made
:more persuasively than with respect to the issue of reproductive freedom for
women. The demand for access to safe, legal and funded abortion has been a cornerstone of the struggle for full sexual and reproductive freedom, which is, in
turn, "an essential precondition to full and equal participation in society." 33 According to Gavigan, concepts such as freedom, equality, autonomy and privacy,
'which are central to liberal law, may in fact be used to legitimize women's right
to demand control of their bodies and to reject state interference. This is particularly true in countries such as Canada where the criminal law has been used to
control or regulate women's reproductive capacity. Until January 28, 1988 when
the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in Morgentaler,34 the
availability of legal abortions was governed by the Criminal Code3 5 and determined in practice by hospital administrators and doctors.
The Morgentaler decision was the culmination of two decades of struggle by
IFeminists against the therapeutic abortion provisions of the CriminalCode.36 In
Toronto feminist and pro-choice activists sought and received the support of
Henry Morgentaler and two other doctors to open a free-standing abortion clinic.
Thus "[a] public campaign was launched, and the challenge to the federal law was
explicit and direct." 37 The clinic was raided and charges were laid. Although Dr.
Morgentaler and his two colleagues, Drs. Smoling and Scott, were acquitted by
ihe jury, the Ontario Court of Appeal set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial.
Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada on
1he grounds that the therapeutic abortion provisions contained in the Criminal
Code violated the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada struck down the Criminal Code provision regulating abortion on the grounds that it violated the principles of fundamental justice guaranteed by the Charter.
But once the heady days following the decision had passed, feminists began to
look more carefully at the actual basis of the decision in order to prepare for the
struggle which lay ahead. 38 Although undeniably a victory in that the extremely
coercive and arbitrary Criminal Code provision was no longer in effect, a reading
of the actual decision demonstrates how narrow the victory actually is.
Amongst the confusing plurality of opinions offered by the Supreme Court regarding the unconstitutionality of the Criminal Code provisions regulating a
woman's access to abortion two common themes emerge. First, there was unanimity that the state has an interest in protecting the foetus. Although there was
no agreement as to when the state's interest ought to surpass a woman's right to
!;ecurity of the person, all of the judges who held that the legislation violated the
Charter concurred that the public interest ought, in certain unidentified
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circumstances, to supersede a woman's private right. This left the legal door
open for the federal government to attempt to recriminalize abortion. Second,
none of the members of the Court addressed the issue of whether or not the government was under an obligation to provide access to safe legal abortions. All
they did was declare that the present criminal law regime violated the Charter.
Thus, by striking down the existing legislation, the Supreme Court disclosed
the limitations inherent in Charterlitigation as an instrument for furthering feminist struggles. Initially, a legal vacuum replaced the criminal provisions; however access to safe and funded abortions continued to depend upon either the response of individual provincial legislatures or individual hospitals. Provincial
responses have ranged from an attempt to prohibit public funding of abortions
except for those cases involving a serious threat to a woman's physical health or
life, to a commitment to fund even those abortions performed in free-standing
clinics .39 More recently, the federal Minister of Justice has introduced legislation which once again threatens to criminalize abortion. 40 Thus, while the Supreme Court's decision in Morgentaler served in the short run to decriminalize
abortion, it has not prevented further attempts by the federal government to recriminalize it nor has it imposed a positive duty upon the state to provide access
to safe, funded abortions.
This analysis of Morgentalersuggests not only that it is impossible to divorce
legal struggles from broader political struggles, but that legal victories are dependent upon the outcomes of political battles. Morgentaler was itself the outcome
of two decades of feminist organizing around the issue of reproductive freedom.
The pro-choice position commanded a great deal of public support, as is evidenced by the fact that every jury which tried Dr. Morgentaler for violating the
therapeutic abortion provisions in the Criminal Code refused to convict him.
Finally the Supreme Court of Canada struck down legislation which was patently unpopular with the majority of Canadian people.
The decision has not, however, ended the debate over the criminalization of
abortion, the issue of foetal rights or the question of state funding. A favourable
resolution of these issues depends upon the ability of feminists to mobilize in
the political arena to obtain legislation which facilitates, rather than restricts, a
woman's reproductive choice. Even now a woman's access to safe and funded
abortion depends upon extra-legal factors-specifically, the political commitments of the provincial governments and the relative political strengths of the
pro-choice and the right-to-life movements. Ultimately, the recognition and enjoyment of bourgeois legal rights depends upon political factors. And even if a
new law is crafted which coheres with Morgentalerthe struggle is not over.
Americans have learnt that judicial decisions are no less subject to reversal than
are legislative policies, 4 1 and that a change in the political climate which might
occasion an alteration in the political composition of the courts can result in the
reversal of historic decisions.
Despite the courts' distinctive institutional form and rhetoric, judicial
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institutions make political decisions-decisions which are directly related to the
distribution of power and the maintenance of, or encroachment upon, existing
social relations. While courts and legislatures are both part of the state, they
have different institutional dynamics, roles and principles of legitimation. In
fact, one of the limitations of the judicial forum as an arena of progressive strugo,le, as the Morgentalerdecision so clearly illustrates, is that the courts are much
nore inclined to strike down legislation than they are to fashion a remedy which
equires elected officials to make an allocation of resources in order to render the
'harter an effective protection of legal rights. 42 Ultimately, disadvantaged
;roups, including women, require positive action by the state to redistribute reources in order to address the substantive inequality which they confront in the
private sphere. 43 Ironically, as we shall see, the liberal rights guaranteed by the
.harter provide another reason for other agencies of the state (the legislature, executive and administrators) not to do anything which will interfere with private
Ictivity.
The second aspect of the claim that the assertion of bourgeois legal rights is an
mportant part of a progressive strategy for social transformation is that such
ights function as catalysts for political mobilization. In Canada, the constituional entrenchment of equality rights became a symbol of profound political
ignificance around which many disparate feminist organizations and women's
,roups were able to coalesce. But is this fact alone sufficient support for the
:laim that the assertion of bourgeois legal rights in the courts is a transformative
truggle? How are we to evaluate the impact of the Charter'sguarantee of equaliy rights on the mobilization of the women's movement in Canada. Does the
'act that a wide variety of feminist organizations and women's groups coalesced
tround the struggle for constitutionally guaranteed equality rights imply that
uch rights are per se progressive? Or does the fact that such rights functioned as
mportant symbols for political mobilization suggest instead something about
he abstract and under-determined nature of the demand for general legal rights?
Elsewhere I have attempted to evaluate the claim that the assertion of constituional and other general legal rights is in itself an extremely important and posiie political act. ' 4 What I found was that while the entrenchment process had a
nobilizing and radicalizing influence on the women's movement, various anti'eminist groups have also employed the Charteras a political symbol, only they
ised it to mobilize opposition to affirmative action for women, to win fathers a
;ay in abortion, to protect the rights of the foetus, and to secure more rights for
nen accused of sexual assault. The fact that the same declaration of abstract and
;eneral legal rights was a mobilizing symbol for groups with opposing political
igendas is not surprising given the indeterminacy of such rights. According to
4obsbawm, "rights in the sense of wide-ranging claims to a good or a tolerable
life, are not ends in themselves, but broad aspirations which can be realized only
hrough complex and changing social strategies, on which they throw no specific
ight." 45 Abstract legal rights require concrete expression as social policies.
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However, what substantive equality rights for women entails only emerges in
the context of particularized litigation.
Thus, it is not possible to evaluate the impact of the entrenchment of equality
rights in the Charter solely in terms of the mobilizing effect it has played. Any
such evaluation requires specific consideration of the mobilizing effects on different groups. There are, however, other criteria which can be used to evaluate the
impact of the Charter. The ultimate goal of the feminist struggle was to provide
institutional recognition of women's equality claims and to provide women with
a legal remedy if their equality claims were not respected. It is obvious, however,
that the actual enjoyment of equality rights is clearly not part of a selfimplementing process. As a result of the government's failure to use proactive
means to remedy legislation which has contributed to systemic discrimination
against women, feminist lawyers and activists turned to the courts to obtain substantive equality for women.
It is, however, important to evaluate the impact of asserting general and abstract legal rights in the judicial forum not only in terms of its potential mobilizing effect and the actual results of litigation, but also with reference to the
form of political discourse constitutional litigation generates. 46 Constitutional
litigation is a peculiarly abstract form of political discourse because it requires
the assertion of bourgeois legal rights to be uncoupled from a class analysis.
Moreover, I want to suggest that this form of political discourse is not confined
to the courts, but has imperialistic tendencies which both enables and requires it
to invade other political institutions. 4 7 Only when the hegemonic capacity of
abstract legal discourse is recognized is it possible to evaluate whether the entrenchment of abstract and general legal rights will facilitate or impede the struggle to transform oppressive social and legal relations.
The use of the Charterby male defendants to challenge the Criminal Code
provisions which are designed to protect women and children from sexual violence or victimization provides an illuminating case study of the impact of the
assertion of bourgeois legal rights upon political discourse. 48 Some of the first
equality cases argued before the courts were brought by male defendants to invoke the guarantees of sex equality contained in the Charter. They sought to invalidate provisions in the Criminal Code which were designed to protect young
women from sexual victimization by older men. In addition, male defendants,
among others, have challenged aspects of the legislation which was designed to
protect women from the worst abuses of the criminal process relating to the
prosecution of sexual offences. 49 Consequently, feminist organizations are having to spend precious time, energy and money in the courts defending legislation
that it took women many years to achieve. Perhaps this is the ultimate paradox
of the Charter: while feminist organizations are attempting to develop situated
and contextual theories of equality which will address women's social and
historical subordination, innumerable other litigants, including defendants
charged with sexual assault offences and right-to-life organizations, are
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simultaneously invoking the Charterto claim a formal equality which may well
erode victories feminists believed they had already won. And this is precisely the
effect of uncoupling bourgeois legal rights from social relations of domination
and subordination.
Feminists have been heartened by a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada which appears to preclude the use of the equality rights guaranteed by the
Charterto strike down legislation, including the CriminalCode sexual assault
offenses, designed specifically to protect or benefit women. In Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia,50 the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the
equality rights guaranteed by s. 15 of the Chartershould not be read formalistically so as to protect only "similarly-situated" groups, but rather should be given
a remedial interpretation so as to protect those groups which have historically
suffered disadvantage. This interpretation would appear to eliminate claims to
equality brought by male defendants accused of sexual assault. However, this decision has come too late for those arguing for the sexual specificity of sexual offences, since the last vestiges of sexual specificity were expunged in response to
the first round of successful Charterchallenges. 51
Feminists have also argued that a substantive interpretation of the equality
rights provision could be used to justify legislation such as the "rape shield" provisions, which would otherwise infringe constitutional protections. Since by far
the majority of victims of sexual assault are women, it is possible to argue that
rape shield legislation is necessary if women are to participate in society on an
equal basis with men. Because the law does not protect the privacy of sexual assault victims, women do not complain to the police and sexual offenders are not
prosecuted or punished, with the result that women are intimidated from participating in public life. According to this analysis, women's equality rights under
the Charter should trump male defendants' rights to natural justice and a fair
trial.5 2 Of course, it would be up to the judiciary to weigh these competing constitutional rights.
But there is something very peculiar about this argument. Instead of directly
confronting the issue of how best to balance the competing social interests and
policies, as the federal government did during the 1983 amendments to the sexual
assault provisions of the Criminal Code, the argument is cast in the form of
competing constitutional rights. In effect, when a defendant raises the issue that
the impugned provision violates his constitutional rights he is asking the court
to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. Ignoring for the moment
the actual outcome of the court's decision, it is important to attend to the form
of the argument. It is essentially dishonest. What the Charter does is detach
form from substance. 53 Instead of directly addressing the question of how best to
promote women's sexual autonomy under social relations which result in women's sexual subordination, feminists who invoke the Chartermust couch their arguments in the rhetoric of equality rights. While it is true that social conditions
will figure in their argument, they will figure only indirectly and to the extent
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that it is necessary to establish the rights claim. What the feminist advocate
must demonstrate is how the law operates to the detriment of historically disadvantaged groups.5 4 Unequal social relations which are not directly sanctioned by
governmental action escape Charterscrutiny, despite the fact that these "private"
disparities of wealth and power are the cause of social inequality. In this way the
feminist discourse about power and unequal social relations is translated into a
discourse of rights and governmental action. Moreover, the legislature need no
longer provide a respite from the abstraction and detachment of the courts, for inconvenient discussions of competing social analyses, visions and interests can
now be swept away by invoking the Charter.55
But the effect of the Charteron the political debate about sexual assault extends beyond its detachment and dishonesty. By reconstituting the political discourse in terms of legal rights, the Charterhas polarized and narrowed the debate
without challenging prevailing practices. The focus is on how the state ought to
respond to coercive sexual practices and the sexual victimization of women and
children. Although this emphasis predates the entrenchment of the Charter,the
Charterreinforces it since its scope is limited to government action, thereby hardening the ideological separation between the "public" political sphere and the
"private" economic and social spheres of life. 56 And even though the equality
rights guarantees of the Charterare available for use when incidents of discrimination are alleged by people who can show that they are victims of systemic discrimination because the world of private ordering has made them so, their equali57
ty claim only arises where a governmental law perpetuates this.
Conclusions
The above examples are offered not as a proof that bourgeois legal rights are inimical to the struggle for social transformation, but rather as illustrations of the
limitations of using bourgeois legal rights to further that struggle. Obviously,
this is a very narrow sampling of the limits to asserting bourgeois legal rights
as part of the struggle for social transformation but examples in other fields have
been offered elsewhere. 58 It may be possible that the attainment of bourgeois legal rights, such as racial equality in the United States, may both contribute to,
and be necessary for, the transformation of oppressive social relations. In fact,
this claim has been made by a number of authors who insist upon the political
significance of the assertion of bourgeois legal rights for visible minorities in
the United States. 5 9 They point to the significance of civil rights litigation as a
tactic in the political struggle to end racial subordination in the United States.
Historically, racially segregated schooling has epitomized the symbolic and material subordination of Blacks in America. 60 After several decades of political
mobilization and struggle by Blacks against racial segregation, the Supreme
Court of the United States issued Brown v. Board of Education,6 1 which put an
end to the invidious "separate but equal" doctrine which was used to justify
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segregation in legal terms. According to Crenshaw, the
[riemoval of these public manifestations of subordination was a significant gain
for all Blacks, although some benefited more than others.... These legal reforms and the formal extension of 'citizenship' were large achievements precisely
because much of what characterized Black oppression was symbolic and formal.62
However, despite this legal transformation there has been little positive change
in the material conditions of Blacks in the United States. 63 In fact, as recently
as the early 1980s a federal district court judge was examining Topeka's schools
to determine if they were in compliance with the original 1955 order issued in
Brown.64
Herein lies the rub with a civil rights litigation strategy: while rights rhetoric
was employed by Blacks to mobilize state power to their benefit against symbolic oppression through formal inequality, the race neutrality of the legal system
simultaneously creates the illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible for the conditions of the Black underclass. 65 In so doing, it has paved
the way for the political backlash which has insisted on strict racial neutrality at
the expense of affirmative action programmes for Blacks. In fact, the shibboleth
of formal equality has been employed by the Reagan administration in the courts
to roll back earlier civil rights litigation victories. 66 Now civil rights organizations are once again lobbying Congress to enact legislation which confronts the
economic and class conflicts underpinning race relations in the United States. 67
But the problem is that if race is not connected to class, equal opportunity and
merit, and not pervasive social relations, are identified as the cause of disparities
of education, income, wealth and power.
The attainment of bourgeois legal rights, however partial and incomplete, by
women, visible minorities and native peoples, may be an important symbolic legal victory. However, in order to achieve these symbolic legal victories it is necessary to detach the struggle for bourgeois legal rights from the struggle for social transformation. According to Wood, the strategic implication of this is
that struggles conceived in purely extra-economic terms-as purely against racism
or gender oppression, for example--are not in themselves fatally dangerous to capitalism in that they could succeed without dismantling the capitalist system, but
at the same time, they are probably unlikely to succeed if they remain detached
from an anti-capitalist struggle. 68
Racism and sexism may not be essential for capitalism to survive, but they are
so deeply linked in particular histories it may be impossible to end these oppressions without also transforming the vast inequalities of power which are part and
parcel of capitalism. But we also know that the transition to socialism will not
guarantee the end of racial and sexual oppression. And it is the belief that true
democracy in socialism requires real freedoms of expression and association and
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substantive equality upon which our commitment to bourgeois legal rights
rests.
The problem is finding a strategy which allows one to acknowledge the value
of liberal institutions while at the same time recognizing the break between liberalism and socialism. I have attempted to show that there are significant limitations to the strategy of asserting bourgeois legal rights in the courts. In fact,
Buroway argues that many overestimate the potential for liberal discourse both
as a tool and a force in its own right for social transformation. He states that "
[t]he extent to which liberal discourse is indeed universal and can be mobilized
by any group signifies its weakness as much as its strength." 6 9 Certainly this
is true of some of the mobilization and litigation strategies adopted to date
which involve the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms. Groups with opposing political agendas have evoked the same rights for incompatible purposes.
But an even more important limitation is the way in which the assertion of
bourgeois legal rights in the courts obscures the material and social conditions
which ground the struggle for social transformation. The distinction between
the public and the private is maintained despite all of its obvious contradictions. 7 0 In order to succeed, civil rights litigation tactics must extricate gender
and racial oppression from class relations. In this way, bourgeois legal rights
"tend to individuate and abstract struggles from their material and social basis."71
Does this mean that the assertion of bourgeois legal rights in the courts
should be avoided as part of the struggle for social transformation? Simply because the extension of liberal rights does not bring about the end of capitalism
it does not follow that these rights are not important features of a democratic society. In the face of legislative, executive, administrative and police incursion,
it is important to assert and defend bourgeois legal rights. But it is difficult to
see how these rights give us much guidance about how to establish and maintain democratic processes which transcend the distinction between the public and
private spheres. The democracy we have now, however important a shield
against the abusive exercise of power, is part of a system which accepts vast
disparities in power. It may be important to assert bourgeois legal rights as
part of a short-term defense against retrenchment, but this is very different from
asserting that such legal rights are an essential aspect of the struggle for social
transformation.
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